In this paper, we consider a risk-averse decision problem for controlleddiffusion processes, with dynamic risk measures, in which multiple risk-averse agents choose their decisions in such a way to minimize their individual accumulated riskcosts over a finite-time horizon. In particular, we introduce multi-structure dynamic risk measures induced from conditional g-expectations, where the latter are associated with the generator functionals of certain BSDEs that implicitly take into account the risk-cost functionals of the risk-averse agents. Here, we also require that such solutions of the BSDEs to satisfy a stochastic viability property with respect to a given closed convex set. Moreover, using a result similar to that of the Arrow-BarankinBlackwell theorem, we establish the existence of consistent optimal decisions for the risk-averse agents, when the set of all Pareto optimal solutions, in the sense of viscosity, for the associated dynamic programming equations is dense in the given closed convex set. Finally, we briefly comment on the characteristics of acceptable risks visa-vis some uncertain future costs or outcomes, in which results from the dynamic risk analysis constitute part of the information used in the risk-averse decision criteria.
Introduction
During the past decades, since the early work of Borch [6] , there have been studies clarifying appropriate solution concepts, such as equilibrium solutions, in connection with optimal risk allocations and risk aversions that are almost exclusively in the context of mathematical economics and insurance (e.g., see [4] , [7] , [8] , [11] , [12] , [17] and [18, pp. 88-96] and the references therein). On the other hand, since the seminal work of Artzner et al. [3] , some interesting studies on characterizing axiomatic concepts such as dynamic risk measures, coherency, consistency and convexity have been reported in the literature (e.g., see [13] , [26] , [29] , [16] or [9] and the references therein). More importantly, we observe that the contributions of these studies at least focused on three interrelated questions: (i) the first one is a conceptual or purely modeling question that deals with, for example, how should solution concepts -such as equilibrium solutions in the context of optimal risk allocations and risk aversions -be defined given new decision theoretic foundations; (ii) the second one is a general question on the behavioral implication -associated with the consistency and coherency of "rational" decisions -of such newly introduced solution concepts; and (iii) the last one is an insight question -where such solution concepts or the associated innovative results might bring to applied contexts in mathematical economics, finance, engineering and elsewhere.
In this paper, we consider a risk-averse decision problem for controlled-diffusion processes, with dynamic risk measures, in which multiple risk-averse agents choose their decisions in such a way to minimize their individual accumulated risk-costs over a finite-time horizon. We specifically introduce multi-structure dynamic risk measures induced from conditional g-expectations, where the latter are associated with the generator functionals of certain BSDEs that implicitly take into account the risk-cost functionals of the risk-averse agents. Here, we also require that such solutions of the BSDEs to satisfy a stochastic viability property with respect to a given closed convex set. Further, using a result similar to the Arrow-Barankin-Blackwell theorem, we establish the existence of consistent optimal decisions for the risk-averse agents, when the set of all Pareto optimal solutions, in the sense of viscosity, for the associated dynamic programming equations is dense in the given closed convex set. Moreover, for such a risk-averse decision problem, where results from the dynamic risk analysis are part of the information used in the risk-averse decision criteria, we briefly comment on the characteristics of acceptable risks vis-á-vis some uncertain future costs or outcomes.
Here, it is worth mentioning that some interesting studies on the dynamic risk measures, based on the conditional g-expecations, have been reported in the literature (e,g. see [26] , [9] and [29] for establishing connection between the risk measures and the generator of BSDE; and see also [31] for characterizing the generator of BSDE according to different risk measures). Moreover, such risk measures are widely used for evaluating the risk of uncertain future outcomes, and also assisting with stipulating minimum interventions for risk management (e.g., see [3] , [26] , [14] , [16] , [13] or [9] for related discussions). Recently, the authors in [30] and [5] have provided in-teresting results on the risk-averse decision problem for Markov decision processes, in discrete-time setting, and, respectively, a hierarchical risk-averse framework for controlled-diffusion processes. Note that the rationale behind our framework follows in some sense the settings of these papers. However, to our knowledge, the problem of risk-aversion for controlled-diffusion processes has not been addressed in the context of multiple risk-averse agents argument, and it is important because it provides a mathematical framework that shows how a such framework can be systematically used to obtain consistently optimal risk-averse decisions. 1 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present some preliminary results that are useful for our main results. In Section 3, using the basic remarks made in Section 2, we state the decision problem for the controlled-diffusion process with multiple risk-averse agents. In Section 4, we present our main resultswhere we introduce a framework that requires a "rational" cooperation among the risk-averse agents so as to achieve an overall optimal risk-averseness. Moreover, we establish the existence of optimal risk-averse solutions for the associated risk-averse dynamic programming equations. Finally, Section 5 provides further remarks.
Preliminary results
Let Ω, F , {F t } t≥0 , P be a probability space, and let {B t } t≥0 be a d-dimensional standard Brownian motion, whose natural filtration, augmented by all P-null sets, is denoted by {F t } t≥0 , so that it satisfies the usual hypotheses (e.g., see [27] ). We consider the following controlled-diffusion process over a given finite-time horizon
where
· is a U j -valued measurable decision processes, which corresponds to the jth risk-averse agent (where U j is an open compact set in R mj , with j = 1, 2, . . . , n); and, furthermore,
i -valued measurable decision processes such that for all t > s, (B t − B s ) is independent of u r for r ≤ s (nonanticipativity condition) and
is uniformly Lipschitz, with bounded first derivative, and 
for some λ > 0.
Notation: Let us introduce the following spaces that will be useful later in the paper.
On the same probability space Ω, F , {F t } t≥0 , P , we consider the following backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE)
where the terminal value Y T = ξ belongs to L 2 Ω, F T , P; R and the generator
with property that g t, y, z 0≤t≤T is progressively measurable for each (y, z) ∈ R × R d . We also assume that g satisfies the following assumption.
Assumption 1
(ii) g t, 0, 0 ∈ H 2 t, T ; R .
(iii) P-a.s., for all t ∈ [0, T ] and y ∈ R, g t, y, 0 = 0.
Then, we state the following lemma, which is used to establish the existence of a unique adapted solution (e.g., see [22] for additional discussions).
Lemma 2
Suppose that Assumption 1 holds true. Then, for any ξ ∈ L 2 Ω, F T , P; R , the BSDE in (2) , with terminal condition Y T = ξ, i.e.,
has a unique adapted solution
Moreover, we recall the following comparison theorem, which is restricted to onedimensional BSDEs (e.g., see [23] 
(ii) Strictly Monotonicity: In addition to (i) above, if we assume that
In the following, we give the definition for a dynamic risk measure that is associated with the generator of BSDE in (2) .
Moreover, if the generator functional g satisfies Assumption 1, then a family of timeconsistent dynamic risk measures ρ
has the following properties (see [26] for additional discussions).
Property 1
2 Here, we remark that, for any t ∈ [0, T ], the conditional g-expectation (denoted by Eg ξ|Ft ) is also defined by
(ii) Monotonicity:
Remark 1 In Section 3, using the basic remarks made in this section, we introduce multi-structure dynamic risk measures (that satisfy the above properties (i)-(v)) induced from conditional g-expectations, where the latter are associated with the generator functionals of certain BSDEs that implicitly take into account the risk-cost functionals of the risk-averse agents.
In this paper, we consider a risk-averse decision problem for the above controlleddiffusion process, in which the decision makers (i.e., the n risk-averse agents with differing risk-averse related responsibilities and information) choose their risk-averse decisions from progressively measurable strategy sets. That is, the jth-agent's decision u j · is a U j -valued measurable control process from
Moreover, we suppose that the risk-averse agents are "rational" (in the sense of making consistent decisions that minimize their individual accumulated risk-costs) with a certain n-tuple of measurable decision processesû = (û
. Further, we consider the following cost functionals providing information about the accumulated risk-costs on the time interval [0, T ] w.r.t. each of the risk-averse agents, i.e.,
where 
3 Moreover, we also assume that f , σ, c j and Ψ j , for p ≥ 1, satisfy the following growth conditions
U i and for some constant K > 0.
Risk-averse decision problem formulation
In order to make our problem formulation more precise, for any
we consider the following forward-SDE with an initial condition X t,x;u ¬j
be a set of real-valued random variables from L 2 (Ω, F T , P; R) and we further suppose that the data ξ T arget j take the following forms
Moreover, we introduce the following risk-value functions
3 Here, we use the notation u ¬j to emphasize the dependence on u
, where U
, for any
-adapted processes (see Definition 2).
Then, taking into account equation (10) (and with the Markovian framework), we can express the above risk-value functions using standard-BSDEs as follows are adapted solutions on [t, T ] × Ω and belong to S 2 t, T ; R × H 2 t, T ; R d . Equivalently, we can also rewrite (13) as a family of BSDEs on the probability space Ω, F , P, {F t } t≥0 ), i.e., for s ∈ [t, T ],
In the following, we denote the solutions Y 
Let K be a closed convex set in R n , then we recall the notion of viability property for the BSDE in (15) (cf. equations (13) and (14)).
Definition 2 Letû
be an n-tuple of "rational" preferable decisions for the risk-averse agents. Then, for a nonempty closed convex set K ⊂ R n and for u 
For the above given closed convex set K, let us define the projection of a point a onto K as follow
Notice that, since K is convex, from the Motzkin's theorem, Π K is single-valued. Further, we recall that d 2 K (·) is convex; and thus, due to Alexandrov's theorem [1] , d 2 K (·) is almost everywhere twice differentiable. Assume that there exists an n-tuple of "rational" decisionsû = (û ] which is preferable by all risk-averse decision-making agents. Moreover, on the space C 1,2
we consider the following system of semilinear parabolic partial differential equations (PDEs)
with the following boundary condition
where, for any φ(
with a(t, x, u ¬j ) = σ(t, x, u ¬j )σ T (t, x, u ¬j ), D x and D Remark 2 Here, we remark that the above system of equations in (20) together with (21) , is associated with the decision problem for the risk-averse agents, restricted to Σ [t,T ] (see Definition 2 below). Moreover, such a system of equations represents a generalized family of HJB equation with additional terms g j for j = 1, 2, . . . , n. Note that the problem of FBSDEs (cf. equations (9) and (15) or (14)) and the solvability of the related system of semilinear parabolic PDEs have been well studied in literature (e.g., see [2] , [19] , [21] , [23] , [24] and [25] ).
Next, we recall the definition of viscosity solutions for (20) along with (21) (e.g., see [10] , [15] or [20] for additional discussions on the notion of viscosity solutions). 
Definition 3 The function
and for
e., a local maximum at (t 0 , x 0 )), then we have
(ii) for every ψ ∈ C 1,2
e., a local minimum at (t 0 , x 0 )), then we have
for j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Next, let us define the viability property for the system of semilinear parabolic PDEs in (20) as follow.
Definition 4
The system of semilinear parabolic PDEs in (20) enjoys the viability property w.r.t. the closed convex set K if and only if, for any Ψ ∈ C p (R d ; R n ) taking values in K, the viscosity solution to (20) satisfies
Later in Section 4, assuming the Markovian framework, we provide additional results that establish a connection between the viability property of the BSDE in (15), w.r.t. the closed convex set K, and the solutions, in the sense viscosity, for the system of semilinear parabolic PDEs in (20) .
In what follows, we introduce a framework that requires a "rational" cooperation among the risk-averse agents so as to achieve an overall risk-averseness (in the sense of Pareto optimality). For example, for any t ∈ [0, T ], let us assume that
is an n-tuple of "rational" preferable decisions for the risk-averse agents, then the problem of finding an optimal risk-averse decision for the jth-agent, where j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, that minimizes the jth-accumulated risk-cost functional, is equivalent to finding an optimal solution for
Remark 3 Here, we remark that the generator functionals g j , for j = 1, 2, . . . , n, contain a common term g that acts on different processes (see equations (13) and (14)). Moreover, due to differing risk-cost functionals w.r.t. each of the agents, we also observe that ρ
, for t ∈ [0, T ], in equation (29) provide multi-structure, time-consistent, dynamic risk measures vis-á-vis some uncertain future outcomes specified by a set of random variables from L 2 (Ω, F T , P; R).
Note that, for any given u
, if the forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) in (9) and (15) (cf. equations (13) and (14)) admit unique solutions and, further, Y t,x;u s (ω) ∈ K, for P-almost ω ∈ Ω and for all s ∈ [t, T ] and for t ∈ [0, T ]. Then, any "rational" preferable decisions for the jth-agent satisfy the followingû
Next, we introduce the following definition for an admissible risk-averse decision system Σ [t,T ] , with multi-structure dynamic risk measures, which provides a logical construct for our main results (e.g., see also [21] ).
Definition 5
For a given finite-time horizon T > 0, we call Σ [t,T ] an admissible risk-averse decision system, if it satisfies the following conditions:
-Ω, F , {F t } t≥0 , P is a complete probability space;
, where
-For any x ∈ R d , the FBSDEs in (9) and (15) admit a unique solution set
on Ω, F , F t , P and
Then, with restriction to the above admissible system, we can state the risk-averse decision problem as follows.
Problem: Find an n-tuple of optimal preferable decisions for the risk-averse agents, i.e.,û · = (û (30) and
with restriction to
Furthermore, the accumulated risk-costs J j , for j = 1, 2, . . . , n, over the timeinterval [0, T ] are given
In the following section, we establish the existence of optimal risk-averse solutions, in the sense of viscosity, for the risk-averse decision problem in (31) with restriction to Σ [0,T ] .
Main results
In this section, we present our main results, where we introduce a framework that requires a "rational" cooperation among the risk-averse agents so as to achieve an overall optimal risk-averseness (in the sense of Pareto optimality). Moreover, such a framework allows us to establish the existence of optimal risk-averse solutions, in the sense of viscosity, to the associated risk-averse dynamic programming equations. 
Proposition 1
and j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, restricted to Σ [t,T ] , the FBSDEs in (9) and (15) admit unique adapted solutions
Moreover, the risk-values V u j j t, x , for j = 1, 2, . . . , n, are deterministic. 
, for j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, be restricted to Σ [t,T ] . Suppose that the system of semilinear parabolic PDEs in (20) enjoys the viability property w.r.t. the closed convex set K.
Then, there exists a constant
Suppose that Proposition 2 holds true, i.e., the system of semilinear parabolic PDEs in (20) enjoys viability property w.r.t. the closed convex set K. 5 Further, assume that the set on the right-hand side of equation (30) is nonempty. Moreover, for
Then, we can define the following partial ordering on K by
for all j = 1, 2, . . . , n, with strict inequality for at least one j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Furthermore, we say that
is a Pareto equilibrium, in the sense of viscosity solutions, if there is no
for which
Then, with restriction to Σ [t,T ] , we can characterize the optimal decisions for the risk-averse agents as follows. 
Proposition 3 Suppose that Proposition 2 holds true and let
Then, ϕ j t, x = Vû j j t, x for j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and for all (t,
, there exists a Pareto equilibrium 
for all t ∈ [0, T ] and for ξ T arget j n j=1
from L 2 (Ω, F T , P.
Further remarks
In this section, we briefly comment on the problem formulation, where the risk-averse decision framework of Section 3 -in which results from the dynamic risk analysis implicitly constitute part of the information used in the context of the risk-averse criteria -requires each of the risk-averse agents to respond optimally (in the sense of bestresponse correspondence) to the decisions of the other risk-averse agents.
Note that, for example, see equations (36)-(38) for the notion of Pareto equilibrium, and see also equation (40) for consistent optimal decisions that are all well defined concepts in the context of risk-aversion problem in (31), with accumulated risk-costs of (7). Here, we remark that, for every ξ
from L 2 (Ω, F T , P; R) and for all t ∈ [0, T ], if there exists an n-tuple of optimal risk-averse decisions, i.e., T ] , such that, for any x ∈ R d , the FBSDEs in (9) and (15) on Ω, F , F t , P and Then, verifying the above condition amounted to solving the stochastic target problem, which can be specified by a set of all acceptable risk-exposures, when t = 0, vis-á-vis some uncertain future costs or outcomes specified by a set of random variables ξ T arget j n j=1
from L 2 (Ω, F T , P; R).
On other hand, assume that the exact information about ξ T arget j ∈ L 2 (Ω, F T , P; R), for j = 1, 2, . . . , n, are not a-priorly known, but we know that such information can be obtained from the following allocation
where L ∈ L 2 (Ω, F T , P; R) is assumed known and n j=1 α j = 1, for some α j ≥ 0, j = 1, 2, . . . , n. Furthermore, if there exists an n-tuple of optimal decisions, i.e., u · ∈ 
